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SOMME FACTS By Bob Butcher Haig chose the strongest part of the German line for his Battle of the Somme. It was fought on 1 July 1916 by the Pals battalions who were wiped out by machine gun fire without gaining any ground. The Somme was a big British defeat. That is a version that may have been gained from much of the Media coverage of the 90th Anniversary. Of course in the WFA we know differently so it may be helpful to compare that version with facts. For a start Haig wanted to attack in Flanders but Joffre insisted on the Somme and the British Government required him to conform to the French wishes. 1st July was only the first day of an offensive that lasted until November during which many fierce battles took place resulting in heavy casualties although fortunately not so massive as on the first day, partly because fewer troops were employed in individual battles. Thirteen British and five French divisions took part on the first day. Of the British divisions, four were composed wholly or mainly of regular battalions, two of Territorials, two of New Army volunteers and five of Pals. (Some Pals had been 'stiffened' with regular brigades and battalions). It is worth noting that with the exception of the Newfoundland Battalion, all infantry units belonged to county regiments, there being no Guards or Dominion troops involved. Of the six British divisions in reserve in the attacking corps, but not actually committed on the 1st, two were Territorials and two New Army. It is, of course, quite understandable that the unique character of the Pals meant that their fate seemed particularly tragic and their deeds especially remembered, but this is hardly fair to the other troops involved who constituted the bulk of the assaulting force. If by 'wiped out' we mean totally destroyed, no battalion was actually completely 'wiped out' although they may have suffered grievous losses. The Newfoundland Battalion came nearest to being destroyed for it suffered 710 casualties on 1 July out of an assaulting force probably only 100 more than that number. A battalion's war establishment was 1020 including transport, left out of battle and other details not actually going over the top. The number of casualties (dead, wounded, missing) suffered by individual battalions varied: 11th Royal Fusiliers, for example had 'only' 224 but on the whole seemed to have been in the 300 to 500 range. It must be admitted that any battalion that sustains such casualties in its early battles will never be quite the same again but would nevertheless still be operational. Machine gun fire undoubtedly proved deadly but eye witness accounts also indicate that a heavy toll of the attackers was taken by the enemy artillery as well. In a sample of casualties admitted to Casualty Clearing Stations taken at another time it was found that bullets (rifle or machine gun) accounted for 39.98% of casualties while those caused by shells and trench mortars amounted to 58.51%. These ratios do not necessarily apply to men killed instantly or who died before reaching a CCS and of course men in no man's land were much more vulnerable to machine gun fire than while in trenches whereas they were always vulnerable to shell fire The 18th and 30th Divisions were completely successful at a cost of just over 3000 casualties each which was rather less than other divisions. The French divisions too, were completely successful. The 4th,36th and 56th Divisions also met with success but these were unfortunately isolated thrusts unsupported on their flanks and therefore proved to be only temporary. There were officially twelve 'Battles of the Somme 1916'. Viewed as a break through attempt (which Haig intended) the offensive must be viewed a failure. Seen as an attritional battle, the issue is less clear. The British ejected the Germans from the strongest positions in France and inflicted heavy casualties upon them There does not appear to be a definitive number of German casualties suffered during the battles but it is generally reckoned that they were about the same, or perhaps a little higher, than the those of the Allies. Of course the aim of attrition is to inflict more casualties upon the enemy than he can afford at an affordable cost to oneself. Ludendorff regarded the Somme as the graveyard of the peace trained German army and that its efficiency deteriorated thereafter (although it remained formidable). He was also forced to retreat to the Hindenburg Line as a direct result of the German losses at Verdun and on the Somme. The Somme can also be said to have been the graveyard of Britain's army of magnificent volunteers although the BEF did later become much more effective. The secret of success Why was the XIII Corps under Lt Gen Congreve and consisting of the 30th (Shea), 18th (Maxse) and in reserve, 9th (Furse) Divisions more successful than most? The Corps attributed it to thorough training in open warfare; to thorough mopping up; preliminary ascertainment by feints of where the German barrage would fall, and rapid movement of the troops over the belts of ground involved (in the initial stage the troops advanced with rifles slung on their shoulders). It does seem, however, that the success on its right flank of the experienced French who were strong in artillery, helped to loosen the defence. British artillery assistance was also particularly effective: the wire was well cut except at one point and a creeping barrage helped the infantry forward (this was probably the first time that this term was used). Several mines proved to be effective and a flame thrower was used against an obstinate machine gun post. Reading the official narrative, one is struck by the effective use made of Lewis gun and bombing parties and trench mortars and it does seem that careful training enabled sub units to manoeuvre independently when confronted by pockets of resistance, even though the initial advance was in lines. In other words training encouraged flexibility and initiative at the lower levels. It will, of course, be remembered that Maj. Gen Maxse was considered to be the most expert trainer in the Army. Corps and divisions with commanders and casualties on first day XIII Corps (Congreve) :18th (Maxse) 3115: 30th (Shea) 3011: 9th (Furse) In reserve.* XV Corps (Horne): 7th (Watts) 3380: 21st (Campbell) 4256, 17th (Pilcher) ** III Corps (Pulteney): 34th (Ingouville-Williams) 6380: 8th (Hudson) 5121, 19th (Bridges) ** X Corps (Morland): 22nd (Rycroft) 3940: 36th (Nugent) 5140: 49th (Perceval) 590 ** VIII Corps (Hunter Weston): (de Lisle) 5240: 4th (Lambton) 5742: 31st (Wanless O'Gowan) 3600, 48th (Fanshawe) ** VII Corps (Snow): 46th Montague Stuart Wortley) 2445: 56th (Hull) 4314: 37th (Gleichen) in reserve. *contained South African Brigade ** in reserve but one brigade attached to assaulting division.
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The Bulletin of the Birmingham Branch of the WFA Compiled by Bob Butcher |
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August 2006 |