THE STATISTICSOF BIRMINGHAM'S WAR

4 Industry

(From 'Brazier and Sandford') *The city made millions of cartridges, shells, fuses and rifles. Hundreds of thousands of Mills hand grenades were also made.

· The Electric and Ordnance Accessories Company Ltd built a new factory ar Drew's Lane, Ward End. It made 38 million fuses.

· Certain parts of shells were produced at a rate of 12 million a week.

· The Birmingham Gas Department extracted over 9,000 tons of TNT during the war which was enough to fill 25--30 million HE shells.

· Wolsely. a subsidiary of Vickers, produced 700 complete aeroplanes as well as 6,000 propellers.

I n 1918 nearly half a million men in civilian life worked in the munitions industry.

Alan Tucker

 

OTHER CAMPAIGNS

5 Mesopotamia (Iraq)

by Bob Butcher

In November 1914 the leading brigade of the 6th Indian Division landed at the tip of Mesopotamia in order to protect British oil interests in the Persian Gulf area and to rally the local population to the Allies and friendly sheiks. When it was joined by the rest of the division permission was granted for it to go for Basra in order to use it as a port base. The Turks fled and the Arabs went on a looting rampage before the British could arrive to restore order. Leave was now granted to occupy Quarna at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates so as to make the British lodgement more secure. It was reached on 9 December.

Reinforcements were sent from India so that 'Force D' now consisted of two divisions and a cavalry brigade, all Indian although they contained some British Army units. (Indian Expeditionary Force A was in France, B and C in East Africa.) The Army Commander received his orders from the India Office in London via the Viceroy in Delhi and the C in C India in Simla. The India Office refused his request for permission to go

For Baghdad but rather cautiously allowed him to advance up the Tigris to Amara and the Euphrates to Nasiriya and subsequently to Kut al Amara, again for the purpose of consolidating the British position. The 6th Division captured Kut in September 1915.

Supplies depended on the rivers which were winding thereby doubling the length of journey and subject to the vagaries of the weather and varying water levels. There were insufficient vessels suitable for navigating the rivers.

Baghdad was more of a political objective than a military one but the Government gave him permission to go for it provided he were satisfied that the force he had available was sufficient. The advance began in November.

Up to now the enemy encountered were mainly Arab soldiers of the Turkish army but at Ctesiphon (24 November) the British came up against well entrenched tough Anatolian Turks. After a hard fight they managed to take the trenches, but then the Turks counter attacked in overwhelming numbers and forced the by now half strength division back. After a difficult retreat the Divisional Commander decided to rest and refit in Kut in the bend of the Tigris. He accepted the certainty of being surrounded as both he and the Army Commander believed that it would quickly be relieved and there were adequate supplies there.

The Turks attacked Kut on 24 December 1915 and were beaten off only with difficulty. Thereafter they were content to starve the garrison out although tray kept the positions under fire.

Three unsuccessful attempts were made to relieve Kut, in January, March and April. By now the garrison was starving and the surrender which took place on 29 April, was unavoidable. The other ranks who fell into captivity suffered appallingly especially at the hands of the Turkish Army's Arab soldiers and a very large number died while prisoners of war.

The Lines of Communication had been over-- stretched and logistics poorly planned. During the advance on Kut and then Baghdad, for example, casualties had been carried forward, instead of to the rear, with the intention of treating them in Baghdad which it was confidently expected would shortly be captured. After failure at Ctesiphon the Medical  Service was completely overwhelmed and had no option but to evacuate the casualties down river in any craft available, none of which was suitable for the purpose. For most of the patients there was no shelter from the fierce sun by day or the bitter cold at night, no food or water, no sanitation and no medical attention. Things were not much better at the Base for here again medical facilities were grossly inadequate. A Commission labelled it disgraceful and inhuman.

For the troops who did not become casualties there was much hard marching, rations were usually inadequate and often unsuitable, drinking water scarce, the heat was intense and the cold bitter, flies and sand tormented them. During 1915 and most of 1916 an improvised staff meant that staff work was poor, often resulting in chaos and the troops were inadequately equipped for the trench fighting in which they had to engage. No wonder the British troops referred to it as 'Mess--pot'

The Army Commander had relinquished his post In January 1916 due to ill health and his replacement concentrated on improving the logistics. In February the War Office took over control of operations from the India Office and in July administrative control. The new Army Commander also retired on health grounds and was replaced by a British Army general who had commanded a brigade in France until wounded and then a division in Gallipoli. It was probably at this time that the post was formally redesignated C in C. He had to remain on the defensive for the rest of the year during which he pushed forward the administrative reforms including the extension of a railway, initiated by his immediate predecessor, reorganised his force and       in general reinvigorated it.

On 13 December the C in C began his advance with one corps of two divisions on either side of the Tigris and a division on the Euphrates. There was fierce fighting but the enemy was outfought and out-gunned and by a series of well conducted moves was out manoeuvred. A deserted and ruined Kut fell on 23 February and Baghdad on 11 March 1917. The latter was being systematically looted when the British arrived.

Operations then began to consolidate the British position in Baghdad and to clear Upper Mesopotamia and North West Persia. They were still under way when Turkey surrendered on 31 October 1918. However the previous November the C in C caught cholera and died, a sad end for a general who had turned defeat into victory. He was succeeded by one of his corps commanders who conducted the rest of the campaign most competently.

What had started out as a small operation with limited aims became a full scale campaign that lasted as long as the war itself. A year of easy success had been followed by disaster, a pause and then two very successful years. The Turks were always a tough enemy, the climate and terrain were formidable, the supply lines long, the attitude of the local Arabs varying from uncertain to hostile, and the initial planning lacking in foresight.

The Order of Battle at the conclusion of the campaign consisted of three corps, five divisions, three cavalry brigades, an armoured car brigade, three Royal Garrison Artillery heavy and siege brigades, a mountain artillery brigade and a RAF Wing. There was also a large number of fighting and administrative troops and miscellaneous units under HQ control and on the Lines of Communication. The list of Lof C troops alone covers seven pages of small print in the Official History Volume IV. Two Indian divisions had earlier been transferred to Egypt. The Royal Navy not only supported the original landing but operated the river craft upon which the maintenance of the force relied.

Although I have referred to 'British', all but one of the divisions were Indian Army, the British elements in them being one battalion in each brigade (or regiment in a cavalry brigade) and the divisional artillery. (Since the Mutiny Indian troops had not been trusted with artillery apart from some mountain artillery.) Apart from the New Amy 13th (Western) Division, the following

Indian divisions fought in Mesopotamia for the whole or part of the campaign: 3rd(Lahore) (ex France), 6th (Poona), 7th (Meerut) (ex France), 14th, 15th 17th, and 18th.

In 1918 there was a daily average of 107,382 British and 140,364 Indian soldiers in the force and 163,879 Indian, Arab, Egyptian, Kurdish and Chinese followers and labourers. The campaign had cost 85,207 battle casualties and 820,418 non-battle casualties (including followers). Thus Mespotamia was a very unhealthy campaign and for every battle casualty there were about ten non-battle casualties.

The end of the war found Britain in possession of the country which, in the coming years, was to cause it much trouble and cost a not inconsiderable number of lives.

 

BOOK OF THE MONTH: If the Mesopotamia item has whetted your appetite, you may like to read THE SIEGE by Russell Braddon, Branch Library number 167. I have not read it but I believe that it gives a good account of the siege of Kut from a different angle from the OH upon which my summary is based: Bob.

The Bulletin of the Birmingham Branch of the WFA

Compiled by Bob Butcher

May 2007